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IS SPECIAL AVIATION LIABILITY
LEGISLATION ESSENTIAL?-P ART I*
By EDWARD C. SWEENEY
Professional Staff Member, U. S. Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce; Professor of Law, Northwestern University
(on leave of absence), and Editor of the JOURNAL.
ECENT airline crashes near air terminals in the New York area
, have brought again to public attention the old questions: What is
the liability of the airline to its passengers and to injured persons on
the ground? What monetary damages should be paid to the innocent
victims of these crashes?
Before the inception of successful mechanical flight in 1904. law-
yers in this country and abroad questioned the adequacy of common
law rules and analbgies to handle the anticipated legal disputes. In
1922, a Uniform State Law for Aeronautics prescribed the liability of
aviators to persons and property on the ground. This Act was adopted,
in whole or in part, by more than twenty-four states. During the 1930's
the adequacy and policies enumerated by this Act were re-examined
by several legal groups. In 1938, the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted a new Code made up of a Uniform Aviation Lia-
bility Act, a Uniform Law of Airflight, and a Uniform Air Jurisdiction
Act.' This Code was opposed by most aviation interests.
Shortly after the Civil Aeronautics Authority opened its doors in
1938, this Code was presented to it. On December 5, 1938, the Au-
thority issued a finding that the adoption of the proposed uniform
liability Acts by the several states might have a vital effect upon the
administration of the Civil Aeronautics Act and instituted a full inves-
tigation. Later, this writer, as a member of the Authority's legal staff,
undertook to make a comprehensive study of all phases of aviation
liability and of aviation insurance practices. The writer's study was
published in 1941 by the Board as a staff report under the title of
"Report to the Civil Aeronautics Board of a Study of the Proposed
Aviation Liability Legislation." In this report of over 400 typed pages,
the writer recommended the enactment of comprehensive Federal lia-
bility legislation which departed radically from ancient common law
principles of liability. With the advent of World War II, this staff
proposal, as well as the 1938 Uniform State Acts, as approved by the
Conference of Commissioners, lost their urgency and no definitive
action was taken. The Commissioners withdrew their endorsement.
* Guest Editor's Note: This article is included in this issue at the request
of the Guest Editor because of its general importance at this time when the inter-
national aviation liability conventions are in the process of being revised.
1 The text of these Acts will be found in Handbook of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the 48th Annual
Conference, pp. 166-70, and 9 J. AIR L. 726-744.
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While time has not permitted extensive revision of the study com-
pleted in 1941, the writer has been urged from time to time to re-
publish this study as it has long been out of print. The final chapters
of this study summarize the factual and legal issues involved in con-
sidering the need for recommending any remedial aviation liability
legislation. The final chapter presents recommendations. A careful
review of the material in these chapters shows that the issues there
raised are still vital and worthy of consideration in 1952. In the fol-
lowing pages these chapters are presented with substantial deletions
and only minor additions.
Issues Involved in Remedial Liability Legislation
Many arguments have been advanced in support of and in opposi-
tion to the adoption of special aviation liability legislation. These
arguments can be focused on ten issues or questions, dealing with dif-
ferent but interrelated factual and legal aspects as more fully developed
in the studies made for the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1941.
1. Do Accidents Occur More Frequently in Air Transportation than
in Other Forms of Transportation?
A comparison of the annual accident statistics for domestic air car-
riers, passenger railroads and intercity buses up to the beginning of
World War II shows that the number of passenger lives lost per passen-
ger mile traveled by scheduled airlines has always exceeded the number
of lives lost per passenger mile traveled on the railroads.
However, when non-fatal injuries as well as fatalities are included
in the comparison, the safety record of the airlines becomes more im-
pressive. The ratio of non-fatal to fatal passenger injuries in railroad
and bus accidents is much greater than that of the air carriers. In most
major airline accidents all the occupants of the plane have been killed
outright, whereas even in serious railroad and bus accidents many
passengers are injured and maimed, but relatively few killed.
If all kinds of passenger injuries are compared, the statistics show
that the chance of a passenger receiving some kind of injury (fatal,
severe or minor) is less per mile traveled by air carrier than by rail-
road or bus; that his chances of receiving a non-fatal injury are sub-
stantially less in air carrier operations, but greater with respect to fatal
injuries than when traveling by railroad or bus.
Injury to persons on the ground by aircraft is a rarity. The killing
of 6 persons in their homes at Elizabeth, New Jersey on January 22,
1952 by an airline plane invoked wide attention in part because of its
unprecedented character. Almost all persons who have been injured
by aircraft have been participating in aviation as passengers or other-
wise. This is not true of the railroads or buses which operate on rights-
of-way with grade crossing and on highways which are shared by or
accessible to third parties. Barring forced landings, the only non-
passengers that an aircraft may conceivably injure between landings
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at airports are persons who may be hit by objects dropped from the
aircraft or injured as a result of mid-air collisions. Most crashes have
not been in congested areas and have not injured persons on the
ground. Crashes and mid-air collisions have been and should continue
to be extremely rare. Of the few persons injured on the ground, a
substantial percentage were on the runways of established landing areas
at the time of injury. The Civil Air Regulations require aircraft to
fly at altitudes and under conditions that should permit them to effect
emergency landings where no damage will be done to persons and
property on the ground.
Appraisal. A statistical study of aviation losses and a comparison
of the number and rate of such losses with those incurred in other
forms of transportation, certainly by itself does not establish that the
accident record of civil aviation is so fundamentally different from that
experienced in other forms of transportation that special remedial lia-
bility legislation is essential. It is one of many factors to be consid-
ered. The total number of fatalities attributable to aviation is insig-
nificant in comparison with the number of persons injured by railroad
trains and automobiles. Moreover, any comparison of the rate of acci-
dent frequency depends very largely upon the standards used for the
comparison. The fact that the ratio of non-fatal to fatal injuries dif-
fers markedly between the various forms of transportation emphasizes
the importance of the standard of comparison employed.
In many respects the significance attached to the comparative acci-
dent record depends upon whether one believes that the need for
remedial liability legislation is more closely related to the total number
of injuries to members of society or to the rate or frequency of such
injuries. In either case many other issues must be considered before
determining a legislative program.
2. Do an Appreciable Number of Persons Injured by Aircraft Have No
Redress at Common Law Because Such Accidents Are Generally
Not Due to the Legal Negligence of the Aircraft Operator?
Many aircraft passengers are said not to be able to recover under
the common law principles of negligence because many aircraft acci-
dents are the result of vis major, unavoidable accident, misconduct of a
third person or undetermined causes. Two independent examinations
have been made of the accident investigation files of the Federal agen-
cies charged with the promotion of safe flying, the first one by Dean
John H. Wigmore in 1937 of the files of the Bureau of Air Commerce
and the latter, made in the course of the writer's staff study, of the files
of the former Independent Air Safety Board covering accidents involv-
ing passenger fatalities in 1939.
It is reported that Dean Wigmore's investigation revealed that "not
in 20% of the accidents which have thus far occurred would it have
been possible for the plaintiff to find and produce provable evidence of
the real cause of the accident." From the examination of 1939 fatal
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passenger accidents, the writer was reasonably confident that the plain-
tiff could establish liability in about 34% of all cases, comprising 44%
of the commercial accidents and 32% of the non-commercial accidents.
The following factors show some of the reasons why a larger per-
centage of aircraft accidents are not due to the operator's negligence
than of accidents involving other forms of transportation:
(a) A number of aircraft accidents are due to encountering danger-
ous weather or atmospheric conditions. If these could not be
foreseen or avoided, accidents resulting therefrom cannot be
said to be due entirely to negligence. Furthermore, atmospheric
conditions are not usually as dangerous or as common on the
surface of the earth, and thus do not as frequently cause acci-
dents to surface transportation.
(b) A large proportion of aircraft accidents are due to an "error of
judgment" on the part of the pilot, which the most experienced
pilots may inadvertently commit. In many instances such an
error may not be considered by a judge or jury as legal negli-
gence, although admittedly there would be many border line
cases.
(c) Accidents attributable to "poor technique" on the part of the
pilot may often be said not to be due to the pilot's intentional
failure to exercise the highest degree of care and skill that he
possesses, and his "poor technique" may well be-held to be that
of a reasonable man with his training and experience.
(d) Aircraft accidents attributable to violations of the Civil Air
Regulations are the only group of accidents that are prima facie
due to the negligence of the operator.
"Aviation is said to be ultra-hazardous because even the best con-
structed and maintained aircraft is so incapable of complete control
that flying creates a risk that the plane, even though carefully con-
structed, maintained and operated, may crash to the injury of persons
and property on the ground. over which the flight is made. ' 2 This is
the argument advanced by the American Law Institute in classifying
aviation as an "ultra-hazardous activity" and by so doing in reaching
the conclusions that the aircraft operator is subject to "absolute liabil-
ity" with respect to persons and property on the ground.
In support of this characterization of aviation, it is pointed out
that approximately one out of every six aircraft in operation in 1939
was involved in some kind of an accident. It is said that this is proof
per se that aircraft are not "fool proof" and that even the best pilots
occasionally have accidents, which are not always attributable to their
own negligence. In further support of the ultra-hazardous argument
it has been urged that negligence plays only a small part in aircraft
accidents for the reasons:
(a) pilots, and especially air transport pilots with passengers, never
2 Vol. III, Restatement of the Law of Torts, page 43.
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intentionally endanger their own lives or those of their passen-
gers by slipshod or foolhardy flying,
(b) maintenance personnel realize the importance of performing
their duties with the greatest of care,
(c) aircraft manufacturers build aircraft as air-worthy as possible,
pursuant to Government regulation, within the limits of the
performance specifications prescribed.
Appraisal. At best, any estimate of the percentage of aircraft acci-
dents that may be due to causes for which no liability would be incurred
by the operator under the common law standards is highly speculative.
In comparison to the number of injuries, the number of lawsuits that
have been litigated has been extremely small. Government accident
files, although not designed to show liability, are perhaps the most re-
liable source of information and the foregoing discussion shows some
of the difficulties and uncertainties that may be encountered in employ-
ing these files for this purpose.
The insurance underwriters' claim and settlement records for air-
line passenger claims were ,examined during the course of the writer's
study in 1940. They indicate that (exclusive of claims shown as un-
settled) 86.3% of the airline fatal passenger claims examined were
voluntarily settled for substantial amounts and 85.7% of non-scheduled
commercial fatal passenger claims were similarly settled. Since the
insurance in these cases covered only the legal liability of the operators,
it is believed that these percentages are significant notwithstanding
the natural desire of the underwriters tb avoid litigation wherever
possible.
All factors considered, the writer concluded in 1941 that if all the
facts concerning the causes of aircraft accident were available, the pilot
or operator would be liable under common law standards of negligence
in at least two-thirds of fatal passenger accidents.
Accidents due to vis major, unpredictable mechanical failure, and
undetermined causes should, it is believed, become less frequent as
government agencies continue to make thorough investigations of the
probable causes of all major accidents and as the science of air naviga-
tion advances with improved equipment and navigational aids, and
as these are installed and used.
In non-commercial flying a surprisingly large number of accidents
were found to involve a wilful violation of the Civil Air Regulations
and to flying practices which were clearly contrary to commonly ac-
cepted standards of safe flying-the buz pilot. While many accidents
may have occurred in the past which were not the fault of the pilot or
operator according to common law standards, probably many of these
accidents were so classified because of the lack of familiarity with air-
craft operations, or an inability to prove the cause, the latter being the
issue raised by the next question.
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3. Do Practical Difficulties Unduly Hinder Production of Legally
Competent Evidence to Prove Negligence in Aviation Suits?
During the 12 years preceding World War II more than 250 passen-
gers were killed in scheduled air carrier accidents, and many more in
other types of flying operations, and yet few aircraft negligence suits
were litigated. It is contended this is due to the fact that counsel for
the plaintiffs have considered it would be impossible to prove that
negligence of the aircraft operator was the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. For this reason it is concluded such parties have found it expe-
dient to accept any settlement offered by the aircraft operator or his
insurer rather than to hazard their entire recovery upon the success of'
proving the negligence of the aircraft operator.
The difficulties confronting the plaintiff in an aircraft negligence
suit are said to be due to the following conditions which are peculiarly
applicable to such accidents:
(1) The aircraft operator, and especially the airline, has control of
all records and physical equipment and properties involved.
This forces the plaintiff to resort to legal process of discovery in
order to determine whether he has cause of action and in order
to organize his case.
(2) Whereas the airline is in a position to prepare its defense im-
mediately following a crash, a delay must necessarily follow
before the plaintiff obtains counsel and is able to organize his
suit. As a result, essential physical evidence frequently is handled
or moved so as to be difficult or expensive for plaintiff to
examine.
(3) Aircraft crashes usually kill all occupants. There are few
"inside" witnesses.
(4) There are seldom any "outside" witnesses to aircraft accidents,
for the reason that the airlanes are not watched by as many pairs
of eyes as are the highways. Aircraft accidents occur suddenly,
frequently commence above the overcast clouds and in remote
areas.
(5) Aircraft operation and navigation is highly technical and the
testimony of lay witnesses, when available, is generally indefinite
and of little use.
(6) All physical evidence of what occurred on an aircraft at the
time of and immediately prior to most serious accidents is
usually demolished by the crash, consumed by fire, and occa-
sionally lost under water.
(7) The track followed by an aircraft is traced in the sky and can-
not be reconstructed as easily as the course of an object on a
highway. This makes it difficult for the plaintiff to prove what
happened to an aircraft immediately preceding a crash.
The foregoing conditions which may tend to render it difficult to
produce legally competent evidence in aircraft negligence suits have
been vociferously challenged as inaccurate:
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(1) The assertion that "aircraft crashes usually kill all of the occu-
pants and inside witnesses" is challenged. In the 35 accidents
involving death to passengers on the domestic airlines between
the years 1933 and 1940, inclusive, 25 resulted in the death of
all occupants of the plane and 10 left some survivors. Among
the 7 passenger fatal accidents that occurred in foreign air trans-
portation during this same period, there were survivors in 4.
Of course, in some cases there were eye witnesses to the accident
other than occupants of the plane.
(2) The assertion that "the track followed by an aircraft is traced
in the sky and cannot be reconstructed as easily as the course
of an object on a highway" is challenged with respect to air
carriers. In the air carrier accidents of which full government
investigations have been made, seldom is difficulty encountered
in accurately reconstructing the flight of the aircraft prior to
crash and the events on the aircraft. The investigators are
aided by the filed flight plan, weather reports, and the plane-to-
ground radio communications during flight.
(3) The assertion that "all physical evidence of what happened...
is usually demolished by the crash, consumed by fire, and occa-
sionally lost under water" is denied by many experts. The
Government investigators are able to reconstruct precisely what
happened prior to crash in the vast majority of cases. The
wrecked aircraft is seldom so completely burned as to leave no
record of the progress of the fire or cause.
(4) In aircraft accidents the negligence of the operator usually oc-
curs some time prior to the actual crash. In air carrier accidents,
particularly, such acts of negligence are frequently a matter of
public and company record which is not kept in the aircraft,
such as, for example, the ship-to-ground radio communications,
the dispatchers' reports, the flight plan, loading schedules and
Government weather reports.
Appraisal. Practical difficulties confronting the plaintiff in secur-
ing legally competent evidence to prove a cause of action in an aircraft
negligence suit are both real and substantial. Aircraft traverse a new
medium of travel at great speed and accidents occur suddenly and
with devastating results. Fundamentally, the difficulties appear to be
due to the fact that aviation is a new and highly mechanized form of
transportation in which the personal element - the skill of the pilot,
the mechanic and the manufacturer plays an important role. The pub-
lic accident hearings, conducted by the Civil Aeronautics Board, reduce
these difficulties considerably, even though the Board's accident in-
vestigation reports may not be used in court.
Furthermore, the difficulties of proof directly attributable to the
highly technical nature of aviation should progressively become less
formidable as plaintiffs and their counsel become more familiar with
the technical aspects of aircraft and of aerial navigation. Eventually
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these should prove no more serious than those now confronting per-
sons injured by other modern mechanized vehicles. It is believed,
however, that much of the confusion resulting from the technical
aspects of aviation may be eliminated by remedial legislation clarifying
the burden of proof, i.e., the burden of going forward with evidence
and the burden of persuasion.
4. Do Administrative Difficulties in the Common Law System of Lia-
bility - Expense, Delay, and Uncertainty of Application of Com-
mon Law Principles and Defenses - Work Undue Hardship Upon
Plaintiffs in Aviation Cases?
Appraisal. The uncertainty of application of common law princi-
ples and defenses in aviation negligence suits (the rules of proximate
causation, assumption of risks, the degree of care owed by the operator
to his passengers, contributory negligence, and res ipsa loquitur) and
the expense and delay incident to such litigation present problems for
the plaintiffs in such suits which are also real and substantial. These
same difficulties likewise cause hardships to the defense, with the result
that litigation is unsatisfactory for all concerned.
The precise application of legal principles to aviation negligence
suits is in a formative state. Since the degree of care that the operator
is required to exercise in order to avoid liability is determined by what
the reasonably prudent man would do under the circumstances, this
degree of care will not be predictable for every circumstance until many
suits involving all types of accidents are litigated. Only a few aviation
negligence suits are currently being litigated and the lack of definite
precedent will probably continue for some time.
The election imposed in many jurisdictions upon plaintiffs of plead-
ing either specific acts of negligence or of relying upon the rule of
res ipsa loquitur, and the uncertainty existing as to the effect of plead-
ing the rule, admittedly cause hardship in many cases. The reports
of the decisions indicate that the courts are aware of these difficulties
and prevent injustice resulting therefrom wherever possible.
It is believed that a considerable amount of this confusion can be
eliminated by adoption of liability legislation. With respect to pas-
sengers, the confusion due to the lack of legal precedent and to the
novel technical aspects of aviation (see Issue No. 3) may be eliminated
by remedial legislation clarifying the burden of proof, i.e., the burden
of going forward with evidence and the burden of persuasion.
5. Does the Existing Diversity of Liability Standards Among the Sev-
eral States Hinder the Development of-Aviation?
As most commercial aviation is interstate in nature, the air carrier
operates under the peculiar condition that both the standard and the
extent or limit of his liability may change each time he flies over a
state line. A survey of the present law and rules of liability among the
several States reveals a startling lack of uniformity in the standards of
liability and in the application of common law principles. In most of
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the states liability is predicated upon general common law principles
of negligence with resulting confusion in application and interpreta-
tion among the different states.
In some 25 jurisdictions, state statutes of various types regulate the
liability of the aircraft operator. Many of these states have statutes
regulating the operator's liability to persons and property on the
ground, and quite a few impose absolute liability. In the remaining
states, there have been so few cases litigated that it is impossible to
ascertain -whether the courts will continue to hold the aircraft operator
liable for all damage done to persons and property on the ground or
upon what theory they will proceed if they so hold. With respect to
liability .to passengers, there are, on the other hand, few regulatory
statutes, but there are many decisions in which the courts have applied
common law principles of negligence with some diversity of holding,
particularly in respect to what constitutes negligence and to the effect
of the rule of res ipsa loquitur.
In addition to the diversity in the standards of liability among the
several states, there is an absence of uniformity as to the amount recov-
erable. Some states have statutes limiting the amount of recovery for
wrongful death. Others have constitutional provisions prohibiting
such statutes, as well as prohibiting legislative limitations upon the
amount recoverable for personal injuries.
Appraisal. An appreciable lack of uniformity among the several
states is apparent in the standards of liability and in the amount recov-
erable. Underwriters of aviation liability insurance must take into
consideration the most unfavorable standards in fixing premium rates.
It undoubtedly would be advisable to have a single standard of liability
applicable to an activity which is so essentially interstate in character
as aviation. On the other hand, each aircraft accident is a liability
problem in itself and the rules that would be applicable thereto in other
states are of little importance. What is most important is that the
rules of the state wherein the accident occurred (or those which govern
the liabilities) are well established and readily applicable to each in-
dividual accident.
6. Does the Present Lack of a Limit Upon the Amount Recoverable
Under the Common Law Constitute a Catastrophe Hazard Which
Creates a Deterrent to the Development of Civil Aviation?
Air carriers are said to be particularly vulnerable to the award of
large judgments under the common law rules governing the measure
of damages. Under the common law the amount recoverable for
personal injury and wrongful death depends upon proof of damages.
For personal injuries the common law attempts to compensate in
damages for the pain and suffering and the financial expenses incurred,
,and for the loss of earning power. In death cases the amount recover-
able is generally controlled by the applicable "Death by Wrongful
Act" statute, which may be a survivorship statute perpetuating the
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right of action of the deceased, or may create an entirely new cause of
action in dependents for wrongful deprivation of support.
There is no statutory limit in any state on the amount recoverable
for nonfatal injuries, and no limit with respect to death in more than
two-thirds of the states. As a result, if a single airline accident injures
or kills a large number of persons, there is almost no limit to the
amount that may be recovered in personal injury and death-by-wrong-
ful-act suits. In jury trials the amount of damages is determined by
the jury who have great discretion, although they are directed to follow
the instructions given by the judge and their verdict may be reviewed
by the court if an abuse of discretion is found.
The common law system of measuring damages permits large re-
coveries by the person who has a large earning capacity at the time of
injury, that is, the active executive with a large annual salary. Children,
college students, housewives, and retired businessmen are ordinarily
precluded from substantial recoveries because they are not active earn-
ers at the time of the accident. Air transportation attracts the business
executive, and a higher percentage of airline passengers have larger
annual earnings than have passengers using other forms of transporta-
tion. While no comparative figures are submitted to support this state-
ment, it is well known that up to the advent of air tourist service air
transportation attracted the luxury class of travelers, comparable to
those that employ the Pullman accommodations of the railroad. This
means that, in respect of the average passenger, the air carrier is sub-
ject to a greater potential liability than the ordinary railroad or bus
operator.
Phenomenally high settlements and judgments have occasionally
been secured by representatives of passengers killed in airline crashes.
Before 1941 settlements are known to have ranged up to as high as
$75,000, although such instances are rare. The author's pre-war study
for the CAB developed that the average of the judgments and voluntary
settlements negotiated by the underwriters with respect to airline
passenger fatal injuries occurring between 1934 and 1938, which were
settled before 1940, amounted to $11,144, including 15 claims where
only nominal settlements were made.
Appraisal. The fact that there is no limit under the common law
upon the amount that injured parties may recover for non-fatal in-
juries in any state and for wrongful death in two-thirds of the states,
and the further fact that there is no over-all limit upon the total lia-
bility that an aircraft operator may incur for damages caused by a
single accident do present a catastrophe hazard to civil aviation. The
lack of a limit upon the liability that the aircraft operator may incur
increases the average of claim settlements and consequently the pre-
mium rates that must be charged for aircraft liability insurance with
reasonably adequate policy limits. On the other hand, such a potential
liability is not different from that to which the operators of other forms
of transportation are now subject in their relations with the public and
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
it can hardly be said to be a financial burden to pay compensatory
damages.
A limitation of liability may be justified in part as the quid pro quo
for imposing liability regardless of negligence. If the common law
standard of liability based upon negligence is preserved, a limitation
may be justified only as a method of subsidizing or encouraging civil
aviation by reducing premium rates and by removing the possibility
that a particularly disastrous accident may occasion liabilities that may
bankrupt the operator. If civil aviation, or commercial air transport
alone, is considered of such national importance that this should be
done, then a statute limiting liability is an effective way of subsidizing
it. Such a limitation of liability in effect shifts to the individual vic-
tim or victims, or to society as a whole, the burden of bearing a portion
of the damages caused by civil aviation whenever damage beyond the
applicable limit of liability is caused by a single accident. Additional
considerations involved in limiting the liability of the aircraft operator
are discussed under question number 8, wherein the advisability of a
system of limited compensation is discussed.
7. Is There a Public Need for Compulsory Aviation Liability or Acci-
dent Insurance?
It is asserted that persons injured in aircraft accidents seldom re-
cover adequate compensation if the aircraft operator does not carry
liability insurance, and that this condition presents a serious problem
due to the small percentage of such operators (other than air carriers)
who carry insurance. The author's study for the CAB showed that on
December 31, 1939, only 5.8% of all non-air carrier aircraft were in-
sured against passenger liability, 11.2% against public liability and
9.83% against property damage. At that time all domestic air carriers
carried liability insurance as a matter of good business practice.
In the event of a crash demolishing the aircraft, many individual
operators are probably unable, irrespective of their degree of negli-
gence, to compensate passengers and third parties injured by the crash
or to reimburse the owners of property damaged. Some aircraft opera-
tors, even those carrying passengers on an irregular basis, are alleged
to be operating on a "shoestring" with little financial backing.
The possibility exists that these operators, in order to avoid personal
liability, may register their aircraft in the names of "Dummy Corpora-
tions" or in the names of members of their families who are "judgment
proof." This is certainly not true of the established airlines, aircraft
operated by large corporations, and many others.
Insurance guarantees the solvency of the potential defendant and
spreads the loss among all operators of a particular class. It is un-
doubtedly the cheapest way for the individual flyer to provide a method
of paying the damages which may be caused by his flying, and if all
aircraft operators were required to carry such insurance the cost of
such insurance coverage, it is pointed out, should be substantially less
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than it is now because of the great increase in the volume of insurance
that would be written.
If a flier cannot pay for the damages he inflicts on the general pub-
lic, particularly that which is due to his own negligence, it is contended
by some he is not in a position to discharge his duty to society and
should not fly until provision is made to discharge this duty. If the
aircraft operator cannot afford to pay premiums to insure the payment
of the damages his flying causes to the general public, should he be
permitted to fly? Is any form of transportation, flying included, so
important that serious damage done to individual members of the gen-
eral public should go uncompensated?
The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 requires the interstate truck and
bus operator to carry small amounts of public and property liability
insurance. Massachusetts alone requires liability insurance on all pri-
vate automobiles. Aircraft operators are not now required to carry
insurance, although several states at one time enacted such require-
ments. However, foreign governments frequently require aircraft oper-
ators to carry insurance.
The cost of insurance is an expense which the commercial airplane
operator would naturally pass on to his customers in the form of in-
creased fares to the extent the traffic will bear it. The private flier,
on the other hand, must bear the entire cost himself. Insurance costs
may weigh heavily on the private flier, who is often a youthful enthu-
siast to whom the gratification of his desire for flying is already a major
expense. Moreover, the cost of the premiums is a considerably larger
item per mile of operation for him than for a commercial operator
who can usually spread it over greater mileage. However, the actual
amount of the premiums should not be large, and if a private flier can-
not afford to pay these modest premiums annually, should he be per-
mitted to fly an aircraft to the possible serious injury of the public?
Compulsory insurance would undoubtedly be a financial burden to
many operators no matter how far premium rates were reduced, and
any such requirement would offer a serious deterrent to the continued
development of private and non-scheduled commercial flying to the
possible impairment of our national defense. The turnover in indi-
vidual airplane ownership is high. This is in part due to the great
expense involved in maintaining and operating private aircraft, and if
the expense of carrying insurance were added to the financial burden
of such operators, this rate would be accelerated.
It is argued that since all scheduled airline operators carry liability
insurance in amounts far exceeding that which would probably be re-
quired by any Governmental regulation, it would appear that there is
no need for including these airlines in any compulsory insurance re-
quirement. Furthermore, commercial corporations operating execu-
tive type aircraft are generally financially solvent, and there is little
need to require them to carry liability insurance. The private aircraft
seldom injures fare-paying passengers who can recover judgments. The
passengers of these small planes are usually "guest riders," students
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receiving dual instructions or joint adventurers. Under this analysis
a statute requiring all aircraft operators to carry liability insurance
would burden many operators and benefit the public only with respect
to the irresponsible commercial aircraft operator, the airport base
operators who may not be solvent and the individual pilot with respect
to large third party claims.
Again, insurance policies do not ordinarily cover accidents result-
ing from strikes, war, riot, civil commotion, acts of public authority,
or accidents (including violations of air traffic rules, etc.). Thus,
compulsory insurance would not afford protection for every victim
of an aircraft accident unless insurance is radically changed, which
would undoubtedly be opposed by the aviation underwriters.
In order for any statute requiring aircraft operators to carry lia-
bility insurance not to operate as a deterrent to the development of
civil aviation, the insurance required to be carried would, of necessity,
have to be written for comparatively small limits. While such insur-
ance would take care of the ordinary claims that arise, it would not
insure payment of damage (or protection to the aircraft operator) in
case of catastrophes. If compulsory insurance does not afford protec-
tion to the public against catastrophe hazards it is argued that it loses
much of its usefulness and does not satisfy one of the fundamental
reasons for requiring aircraft operators to carry liability insurance.
Appraisal. The victim of an aircraft accident has two problems
in attempting by law suit to secure compensation for his injury; the
first is to establish the liability of the aircraft operator by securing a
judgment, and the second is to collect the Judgment he obtains. The
collection of judgments for wrongful death or personal injuries is a
problem that is not peculiar to aviation, but is found in all tort litiga-
tion, and in a particularly exaggerated form in connection with pri-
vate automobile accidents where so many drivers are "judgment proof."
Undoubtedly the victim of an aircraft accident has a much better
chance of obtaining compensation if the operator carries insurance.
While the ordinary insurance policy does not cover all types of acci-
dents for which the operator may be liable (particularly those involv-
ing violations of laws and regulations), and may not be written in an
amount to cover catastrophe hazards, it affords protection to the vast
majority of persons injured by the insured. Thus, a statute prescribing
the carrying of liability or accident (admitted liability) insurance
would benefit the victim of aircraft accidents and would be desirable
if it involves no serious disadvantages to aviation.
It is difficult to estimate the premium that would have to be charged
if liability or accident insurance were prescribed for aircraft operators,
but it appears that the cost would be fairly small if the accident record
of past years may be relied upon. While compulsory insurance may
have an initial adverse effect upon the development of general and
non-scheduled commercial flying, it should not create a serious and
lasting impediment.
It was concluded in 1941 that action should then be initiated
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looking toward the eventual insurance of all aircraft, provided proper
safeguards could be taken to prevent such action from imposing an
undue financial burden on the development of any form of civil avia-
tion. The means of accomplishing this, are suggested in the final
recommendations.
8. Would a System of Absolute Limited Liability, Similar to Work-
men's Compensation, Be a Fairer Method of Adjusting Aviation
Losses Than the Present Common Law System?
Contentions supporting the adoption of such a system, as a matter
of social philosophy, it is urged that it is better there be an assured
recovery to everyone injured of a limited amount than that recovery
depend upon proof of negligence and only a small percentage of in-
jured persons recover any amount of damages. The common law sys-
tem, even with recovery assured by means of a compulsory insurance
requirement, does not take care of those cases where injuries are sus-
tained when neither the operator nor the injured party is at fault.
A system of absolute limited liability, such as is embodied in the
Workmen's Compensation Laws, is represented as the modern trend
in American jurisprudence. In such a system, the three elements of
absolute liability, limited recovery, and compulsory insurance are
equally essential. Absolute liability is represented as a principle not
only of social expediency, but of social necessity, which alone will afford
reasonable coripensation to all persons injured by civil aircraft.
It is contended that it is more desirable to require the aviation
industry to pay limited compensation to all injured parties than to
have those who fail to recover damages under the present law become
immediately dependent upon society as a whole.
It is argued by some that aviation is ultrahazardous in the sense
that accidents frequently occur which are not due to the negligence of
the aircraft operator and that, this being true, all losses directly attribu-
table thereto should be borne by the industry as part of its cost rather
than by the public or any member thereof who is injured without the
fault of either party. Civil aviation, even in 1952, is a relatively new
and growing form of transportation, and it is urged this is an appropri-
ate time to adopt a new system of liability that incorporates modern
social philosophy.
Such a system of compensation applied to commercial aviation
would result in passing on the cost thereof to the users of the service.
Private aviation presents a somewhat different problem, in that few
advocate that the private flier should be absolutely liable for injury or
death to passengers gratuitously carried, but the argument is that he
should not participate in aviation if he cannot afford to carry insurance
to compensate persons and property on the ground for injuries caused
by his aircraft.
A satisfactory social adjustment of losses attributable to aviation
demands, it is asserted, that all injured parties, both passengers and
persons on the ground, recover a limited sum with a minimum of delay,
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expense and uncertainty. This would eliminate the gambling element
of lawsuits by which many injured persons recover nothing at all and
a few recover exorbitant amounts, depending upon the skill of their
counsel as much as on the merits of their claims.
An arbitrary limitation upon the amount that may be recovered
appears socially justifiable. Pecuniary damages can at best only con-
stitute approximate compensation for pain and personal injury. Com-
pensation for loss of earning power may perhaps be more accurately
measured, but even this depends upon an estimation of future earnings.
Recognizing that damages awarded by a court or a jury are only an
approximation, a legal system of compensation need not attempt to
grant more than a specified maximum amount of compensation - an
amount that will not permit the injured party or his dependents to
become dependents on society. The balance of the loss may properly
be borne by the injured party and not shifted to a new and essential
form of transportation such as aviation, which is today not only com-
mercially indispensable, but also a vital part of our national defense.
As in all other forms of transportation, the passenger may properly
be held to assume certain risks inherent in the means of conveyance
he has chosen. One of these risks may Well be a limitation on the
amount he may recover, irrespective of negligence.
The limited liability feature of a system of compulsory compensa-
tion should have the result of fostering aviation by reducing the present
cost of insurance. Placing a reasonable limitation upon the amount
of recovery and removing the uncertainty and expense now involved
in litigation should reduce substantially, it is estimated, the total sum
paid by the aviation industry in adjustment and satisfaction of claims,
notwithstanding the adoption of absolute liability.
Adoption of a limited compensation plan should also have no appre-
ciable effect, it is contended, in increasing the number of fraudulent
claims, or lead to other abuses feared by those who oppose such legisla-
tion. Requiring liability insurance to be carried by the motor carrier
operator under the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, has led to no such abuses,
and independent investigating committees have found that the Massa-
chusetts Automobile Security Act has not appreciably increased fraud-
ulent claims.
Statistics of aircraft accidents kept by the aviation underwriters as
well as by the Government should furnish ample experience for sci-
entifically establishing insurance rates. If complete, absolute liability
is approximated the only statistics necessary to determine an insurance
rate are the number of accidents and the number of persons killed and
injured, and the amount of damages. Placing of a limitation on the
amount recoverable should remove the necessity of loading rates to
take care of the potential catastrophe hazard now presented. The
imposition of absolute liability should not result in the successful prose-
cution of false claims.
A limited compensation plan would also prevent the aviation
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underwriters (if they ever have) from taking advantage of the uncer-
tainty and confusion existing in the present law of liability to effect
unreasonably low settlements with claimants. Such a system would
eliminate the necessity of claimants employing attorneys, at least to the
same extent as this has been true of workmen's compensation cases.
This would mean that the contingent fees usually paid attorneys, rang-
ing from 25 to 50% of the amount recovered, should go to the injured
persons themselves, or their representatives or dependents, thus in effect
substantially increasing the amount of compensation.
Although it is recognized that the employer-employee relationship
may well furnish the ideal condition for the smooth functioning of an
absolutely automatic compensation system, why is such a situation the
only one in which a compensation system should be found workable?
In the relationship of the aircraft operator to the persons injured by
his flying the principle of limited absolute liability (compensation)
may well be adopted, and the amount of such compensation for any
given case may be permitted to vary between a fixed maximum and a
fixed minimum in order to afford the flexibility necessary io meet the
varying economic considerations which will be found. Such a flexible
system of compensation is better, it is contended, than the common law
systems of completely unlimited liability on the one hand, and better
than an absolutely right compensation systems on the other.
The adoption of a comprehensive system of compensation for avia-
tion accidents should be accepted by the public not as a branding of
aviation as extrahazardous, but rather as an indication that aviation
as a transportation industry has reached a point of maturity at which
it is regarded as feasible to provide for the cooperative underwriting
(by operators, insurers and, to a certaint extent, by the United States
Government through the medium of mail pay) of all accidents which
may occur. An attitude of cooperation on the part of the industry in
favoring such a system should strengthen this impression while an atti-
tude of hostility might somewhat weaken it.
Contentions opposing the adoption of such a system. A system of
limited compensation is not in accord with the prevailing Anglo-
American concept of justice which is based upon the premise that in
being a member of organized society one assumes the risk of harm not
caused by the fault of another. Pursuant to this philosophy, one in-
jured by the normal course of conduct pursued by another must not
expect to collect for unavoidable injuries resulting therefrom. The
fact that historically aviation is a relatively new source of harm is
immaterial.
Viewed from a social aspect, it is contended, aviation should no
more be classified as ultrahazardous and subjected to absolute liability
than should railroads or automobiles and other forms of transporta-
tion. Imposition of absolute liability in place of the present system
under which liability is placed upon fault would be injurious to com-
mercial aviation in that it would constitute an unjust discrimination
against it in favor of other forms of transportation.
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After an injury has occurred under circumstances indicating that
it was caused by legally culpable conduct, other considerations come
into play. Any system under which the injured party may not recover
the full extent of his losses (as loss is determined by judge and jury) is
branded as essentially arbitrary, unfair and not in accord with the
American belief that one should pay the full limit of the injury caused
by his fault. Liability in damages to the extent of injury caused is
viewed by the common law as a sanction whereby legitimate conduct
is secured.
When viewed from the economic standpoint, it is argued the abso-
lute liability feature of a system of limited compensation will be disas-
trous because it necessarily produces a prohibitive increase in insurance
rates. Experience tinder the Massachusetts Compulsory Automobile
Security Act has amply'demonstrated this to the satisfaction of many
competent observers. If every operator of aircraft, commercial and non-
commercial, is required to carry insurance, the underwriters will no
longer be able to select only sound risks and the combined liability of
all operators is bound to be reflected in higher rates. Furthermore,
the knowledge on the part of the public that all aircraft operators are
insured, and hence financially answerable, will result in many exagger-
ated and perhaps even fraudulent claims being presented. There will
be many opportunities for petty claims for injuries being presented by
"passengers" which may not be serious but which may be grossly ex-
aggerated by unscrupulous plaintiffs. Moreover, injuries for which
settlements are now being effected in lesser but adequate amounts, will
be comnensated in accordance with the maximum recovery specified
in the legislation.
The underwriters contend, in opposition to the absolute liability
feature of anyproposal, that it would render it impossible for them to
estimate mathematically the cost of the liability insurance prescribed
and that they would not be justified in hazarding a guess as to the cost
of such insurance. For years following the adoption of a statutory
limited compensation plan, the aviation underwriters assert they would
be unable to fix rates upon a definite mathematical basis because of
complete lack of experience as to the effect of the new standards of
liability upon the number and amount of claims. As a result, rates
would have to be fixed at a sufficiently high level to take care of any
contingency.
If the proposed system involves a substantial increase in. present
premium rates the cost thereof would be prohibitive to most aircraft
operators, particularly the private fliers, who could not pass on the
additional cost thereof to the traveling public or to the United States
Government in the form of mail pay or subsidy claims. Even a small
insurance premium would be a burden to private fliers who find the
upkeep and operation of an aircraft an expensive activity. •
The pre-war settlement record of the insurance underwriters, as
shown by the author's study for the CAB, is said to show that they have
not attempted to take advantage of the alleged uncertainty and confu-
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sion in the law to effect unreasonably low settlements, but that, on the
contrary they have made substantial settlements of most claims and
have been fair with each individual claimant.
The fancied analogy between the proposed legislation and the
Workmen's Compensation Laws is said to be illusory because of the
absence, as between the aircraft operator and his passengers or persons
on the ground, of that relationship which alone renders Workmen's
Compensation Laws fair and workable. The claimant and the aircraft
operator are strangers. Between the employer and the employee there
are mutual responsibilities and control, and the salary paid to the em-
ployee affords an equitable basis for fixing the amount of compensation.
It is argued that it would be impossible to devise a fair and equitable
scale of compensation benefits for aviation accidents because there is
no common norm which could be used as a basis for fixing recovery
as in workmen's compensation cases. With respect to an injured child,
housewife or non-worker, there would be no basis on which benefits
could be computed. The psychological effect of the imposition of
absolute liability would be adverse to aviation, since the imposition of
such a liability-by statute would brand aviation as ultrahazardous in
the eyes of the general public and would retard the development of air
travel.
Appraisal. The adoption by legislation of a system of limited
absolute liability applicable to aviation losses would be in line with
the social philosophy that led to the adoption of workmen's compen-
sation laws. The enactment of such a system would be premised upon
the conviction that the traditional common law system of liability
based upon fault is not adaptable to a highly mechanized form of trans-
portation such as aviation. The plan of liability embodied in the
Warsaw Convention relative to international passengers appears to
have been designed in part to promote international aviation by reliev-
ing it of certain liabilities rather than as a complete system governing
all the liabilities of the international operator.
A limited compensation system, which eliminates the issue of the
operator's fault, is probably the best proposal that has been advanced
to insure that all injured parties, both passengers and persons on the
ground, receive a limited sum with a minimum of delay, expense and
uncertainty. Admittedly, such a system would be experimental in
nature and might not work out as the advocates thereof anticipate.
From the best information that can be obtained the cost thereof would
not be prohibitive.
One additional problem is, whether this is an appropriate time for
a Federal Government agency to recommend experimental legislation
of this type. There is no public demand for the adoption of such a
system and never has been, as there was when workmen's compensation
laws were first adopted.
(To be concluded)
